

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 0584

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, JO, XF
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS FROM AMMAN: INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS ON
WEST BANK AND GAZA

SUMMARY: INITIAL JORDANIAN REACTIONS TO FLURRY OF
EVENTS OVER THE WEEKEND HAVE INCREASED LOCAL SKEPTICISM
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTAINING A DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES CLEAR CUT ENOUGH TO BRING HUSSEIN INTO
NEGOTIATIONS. EMBASSY SHARES THAT SKEPTICISM, BUT
BELIEVES SOME COMBINATION OF A DECLARATION WITH
FURTHER ELUCIDATION OF THE OUTLINE OF A TRANSITIONAL
REGIME ON THE WEST BANK MIGHT BE A BETTER PLAN TO
FOLLOW. CONCURRENTLY, HARVARD PROFESSOR SAFRAN
ARRIVED IN AMMAN WITH SOME INTERIM OR TRANSITIONAL
REGIME IDEAS WHICH HE TRIED OUT, HE SAYS FAVORABLY,
ON YADIN. SOME OF THESE IDEAS STRIKE US AS USEFUL.
END SUMMARY

1. HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO REMAIN SKEPTICAL THAT A
DECLARATION WHICH CAN COME ANYWHERE NEAR MEETING
HIS NEEDS IN ORDER TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE
REACHED WITH THE ISRAELIS. WHILE HE HAS DRAWN
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NO CLEAR CUT DEFINITIONS OF WHAT IS REQUIRED, AS
A RESULT OF THE TEHRAN MEETINGS AND FURTHER DIS-
CUSSION HERE, IT SEEMS THAT THE TWO POINTS WHICH
HE RAISES (FULL TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWAL AND SELF-
DETERMINATION WITH A RATHER GENUINE INDEPENDENCE
OPTION) ARE FARTHEST FROM WHAT BEGIN COULD OR WOULD
GIVE. IT ALSO STRIKES US HERE AS TRUE THAT A

DECLARATION ATTACKS THE HEART OF THE PEACE ISSUE--
THE TOUGHEST PROBLEMS--AT THE TIME WHEN THE PROCESS
IS LEAST RIPE FOR AGREEMENT ON SUCH POINTS.

2. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHETHER A
DECLARATION WHICH MOVES THE QUESTION ONLY A SLIGHT
BIT FORWARD FROM THE AMBIGUITIES OF 242 MIGHT NOT
BE COMBINED WITH SOME FURTHER WORK ON THE SHAPE OF
A SETTLEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH COULD
THEN PROVIDE A BETTER FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE JORDANIAN
PARTICIPATION. THE KING HAS OF COURSE GONE PRETTY
FAR OUT ON THE LIMB IN FINDING BEGIN'S PRESENT PRO-
POSALS UNACCEPTABLE. THE KEY IS STILL OBVIOUSLY
WHETHER ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY
IN A WAY WHICH, WHILE IT MIGHT LEAVE ISRAELI FORCES
THERE FOR PEACEKEEPING, WOULD STILL LET IT COME
UNDER ARAB CONTROL. AT SOME POINT MORE DETAILS OF
HOW THIS IS TO HAPPEN MIGHT BE EASIER TO ARRANGE
THAN THE PRINCIPLES, GIVEN THE STUBBORN ATTACHMENT
OF THE LEADERS OF BOTH PARTIES TO QUESTIONS OF
PRINCIPLE. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE ALSO THAT
THE ATHERTON BACKGROUNDER HAS BEGUN TO FOCUS ON AN
INTERIM OR TRANSITIONAL REGIME FOR THE WEST BANK.

3. CONCURRENT WITH THE ABOVE THINKING, HARVARD
PROFESSOR SAFRAN HAS COME TO JORDAN AFTER SPENDING
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TEN DAYS OR SO IN EGYPT AND JERUSALEM. HE CLAIMS
HE SPOKE WITH YADIN ABOUT HIS (SAFRAN'S) IDEAS AND
THAT YADIN FOUND THEM INTERESTING ENOUGH TO INTRODUCE
SAFRAN TO BEGIN AT THE KNESSET AND SUGGEST SETTING
UP A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO WHEN SAFRAN RETURNS
SHORTLY TO ISRAEL. FOR THIS REASON ALONE, A SUMMARY
OF SAFRAN'S IDEAS MIGHT ALSO BE OF INTEREST TO THE
SECRETARY'S PARTY. WE FOUND SOME OF THEM OF POSSIBLE
USEFULNESS. SAFRAN ALSO BRIEFED CROWN PRINCE HASSAN
ON THESE IDEAS WITH REACTIONS GENERALLY NEGATIVE ON
HASSAN'S PART AS SET OUT BELOW.

4. THE PROPOSAL IS ESSENTIALLY TO TRY TO MARRY
242 WITH PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AT ASWAN ON THE
PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIANS IN DETERMINATION OF
THEIR OWN FUTURE. ONE KEY ELEMENT WOULD BE TO
LEAVE THE FINAL ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR A
LONG PERIOD ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT BEGIN CANNOT
HIMSELF AGREE TO RELINQUISH SOVEREIGNTY, BUT THAT
OVER TIME A FUTURE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE
A GREATER CAPACITY TO DO THIS. SAFRAN SUGGESTS
TRANSITIONAL REGIME LAST FROM 7-10 YEARS. AT THE

END OF THIS TIME THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE A
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR
OWN FUTURE TO INCLUDE ANY ALTERNATIVE AS LONG AS
THAT ALTERNATIVE WAS "COMPATIBLE WITH THE SECURITY
INTEREST" OF THE THREE PARTIES CONCERNED--ISRAEL,
JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA. HE RECOGNIZES, AS WE DO, THAT THIS IS A
HOOKER WHICH WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE FURTHER DEFINED.
HOWEVER THE DEFINITION MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXCLUDE THE
NECESSITY OF MARRYING OF SECURITY AND TERRITORY BY
SETTING BROADER PARAMETERS FOR THE PARTIES' MUTUAL
SECURITY, I.E., FREEDOM FROM ATTACK, SUFFICIENT
EARLY WARNING AND OBSERVATION POSTS, ETC.

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

5. IN THE INTERIM, A SPECIAL REGIME WOULD BE
CREATED FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IT WILL CENTER
AROUND A TRIPARTITE AUTHORITY COMPOSED OF ISRAEL,
JORDAN AND THE AUTONOMOUS ARAB GOVERNMENT OF THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA. IT WILL HAVE TO TAKE DECISIONS
BY UNANIMITY AND THIS RULE WOULD PROTECT ISRAEL
AGAINST THE OTHERS ON SECURITY QUESTIONS AS
SPECIALLY DEFINED, AND PROTECT THE OTHERS AGAINST
ISRAELI ARBITRARY ACTION ON ADDITIONAL POINTS SUCH
AS LAND SEIZURES. ALL POWERS WILL GO TO THE AUTONOMOUS
ARAB AUTHORITY EXCEPT SECURITY ISSUES. WHAT IS CALLED BASIC
SECURITY OR EXTERNAL DEFENSE OF THE WEST BANK WOULD BE
EXCLUSIVELY ISRAELI. CURRENT SECURITY WOULD BE TRIPARTITE
AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WHERE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, INTERNAL
SECURITY WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF WEST BANK
POLICEMEN. ISRAEL AND JORDAN WOULD COOPERATE IN

PROVIDING INFORMATION. ANY ACTION OR ACTIVITIES WHICH
THREATENED PERSONS OR GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WEST
BANK WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY ISRAEL UNDER BASIC SECURITY
RUBRIC. IN ADDITION, ISRAEL-- THROUGH THE
TRIPARTITE COUNCIL-- WOULD HAVE
VETO POWER OVER IMMIGRATION OF PALESTINIANS TO THE WEST
BANK ON THE BASIS OF ONLY TWO GROUNDS--SECURITY
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AND THE CONTINUING ECONOMIC CAPACITY OF THE WEST
BANK TO ABSORB SUCH REFUGEES. ON THE THORNY QUESTION
OF GOVERNMENTAL LAND TRANSFER, SUCH SHOULD TAKE PLACE
ONLY ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION.
THUS, IF ARABS WERE FREELY ABLE TO BUY GOVERNMENT LAND
IN ISRAEL, GOVERNMENT LAND IN THE WEST BANK COULD ALSO
BE SO TRANSFERRED. THE UNANIMITY RULE OF THE TRIPARTITE
BODY WOULD APPLY. PRIVATE LAND TRANSFER WOULD BE
POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF A WILLING BUYER AND A
WILLING SELLER IN BOTH ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK.
ISRAELI ARMED FORCES WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN
TO A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF CANTONMENTS. WHILE NOT
STATED, PRESUMABLY THEY WOULD BE FULLY WITHDRAWN
AFTER THE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. IN THE
INTERIM A KIND OF BENELUX ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
WOULD BE CREATED. THE PLAN WOULD HAVE AT LEAST AN
OPTION FOR WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS TO VOTE TO
CONTINUE THIS SORT OF ARRANGEMENT OR CHOOSE OTHER
ARRANGEMENTS--INDEPENDENCE OR LINKS WITH JORDAN.
COMMENT: THERE IS OBVIOUS OVERLAP AND THERE ARE SOME DEFINITION
PROBLEMS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT.

6. IDEA WAS ALSO TRIED OUT ON WEIZMAN AND PERES.
WE DO NOT KNOW WEIZMAN'S REACTION BUT PERES RELATED
IT PRINCIPALLY TO HIS OWN IDEAS FOR A CONFEDERATION
OF JORDAN, THE TERRITORIES AND ISRAEL.

7. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN REACTED NEGATIVELY BECAUSE
THE PLAN DID NOT TREAT JERUSALEM ISSUE. IN ADDITION,
HE THOUGHT OVERWHELMING ISRAELI ECONOMIC POWER WOULD
PROVIDE UNFAIR ADVANTAGE AND PREJUDICE THE SOLUTION
AGAINST THE ARABS. HE RAISED AN ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN
ON HIS MIND FOR SOME TIME--IF ISRAELIS INSIST ON
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KEEPING SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND SINAI, WHY
COULD NOT THE ARABS INSIST ON RECIPROCAL LINKS WITH

ARAB VILLAGES, SAY IN UPPER GALILEE? SAFRAN THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO TOUCH ON JERUSALEM BECAUSE OF ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES. IDEA OF LIMITS ON EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM, COUPLED WITH A LINK BETWEEN JERUSALEM ARABS AND THOSE OF THE WEST BANK AS PART OF AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, WITH A COMMITMENT BY BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS TO SETTLE THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM DURING TRANSITION, WAS ALSO RAISED AS A POSSIBLE WAY TO DEAL WITH JERUSALEM. HASSAN THOUGHT SUCH MIGHT HELP, BUT NOT SOLVE ARAB CONCERNS OVER JERUSALEM. ALSO QUESTION OF PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OR DRAW-DOWN ON ISRAELI FORCES FROM CANTONMENTS DURING TRANSITION PERIOD WAS CONSIDERED IN DISCUSSIONS. HASSAN LEFT SAFRAN WITH LITTLE HOPE THAT PLAN WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AS EXPLAINED. NEVERTHELESS, WE FEEL THAT THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF IT WHICH MIGHT BE VALUABLE IN ON-GOING THINKING ON THE PROBLEM.

8. KING HUSSEIN HAS STATED STRONGLY THAT HE WISHES TO MAXIMIZE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME--U.N. ASPECT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO MINIMIZE THIS IN ORDER TO MUTE THE NOTION--WHICH SAFRAN SAYS BEGIN WOULD OPPOSE--THAT THE PLAN WOULD LEAD TO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY, IMPLIED BY POWER OF SOME AUTHORITY TO DISSOLVE UN PRESENCE. ONE POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN TRIPARTITE INTERIM AUTHORITY AND UN MIGHT BE TO USE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE OR APPROVE IT, AND THIS COULD BE ONE WAY TO COMPROMISE OUT ANY DIFFERENCES ON THIS POINT.

9. ONE VALUE OF AN INTERIM OR TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT IS THAT IT CAN MUTE FOR THE TIME BEING FINAL OUTCOMES. HOWEVER, FOR THE ARABS, ANY TRANSITIONAL
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ARRANGEMENT WOULD HAVE TO HAVE, IN OUR VIEW, A WIDE ELEMENT OF FREE CHOICE AT THE END AND NOT EXCLUDE AB INITIO FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS A RESULT OF THAT SELF-DETERMINATION PROCESS. THIS COULD BE DONE WITH THE PROVISIO THAT CONTINUING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT REMAIN IN EFFECT WHICH COULD INCLUDE ISRAELI PRESENCE, BUT NOT PERMIT ISRAELI CONTROL OVER WEST BANK AND GAZA AFFAIRS.
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